Forum on

THE COMMUNITY AND RACIAL CRISES

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Forum Handbook

THE COMMUNITY AND RACIAL CRISES

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PANEL

Chairman: DAVID STAHL, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, former Executive Director of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; former Attorney General of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Solicitor of the City of Pittsburgh

JOSEPH M. BAIL, Chief of Police, Chester, Pa.

BERL I. BERNHARD, Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; former Staff Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights

DAVID W. CRAIG, City Solicitor, City of Pittsburgh, former President, American Society of Planning Officials

ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., Professor of Law, George Washington University

JOHN H. DOYLE III, Patterson, Belknap & Webb, New York City (on leave); Assistant Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law

JOHN G. FEILD, Director, Community Relations Service, U. S. Conference of Mayors; former Executive Director, The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity; former Executive Director, Michigan Fair Employment Practices Commission

HAROLD C. FLEMING, Acting Deputy Director, Community Relations Service, United States Department of Commerce; Executive Vice-President, Potomac Institute

GEORGE H. FOWLER, Chairman, New York State Commission for Human Rights

HERMAN W. GOLDNER, Mayor, St. Petersburg, Florida; Chairman, Community Relations Service, U. S. Conference of Mayors

JAMES H. GORBET, Mayor, Chester, Pa.

JACK GREENBERG, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund

HAROLD H. GREENE, Chief, Appeals and Research Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice
JOHN GRIFFIN, Head of Conciliation Services, Community
Relations Service, United States Department
of Commerce

LAWRENCE JACOBSON, Assistant City Solicitor, Chester, Pa.

JOHN LANKENAU, former Asst. U. S. Attorney, Southern Dist. of N.Y.

STANLEY H. LOWELL, Chairman, N. Y. City Commission on Human Rights

J. ROBERT LUNNEY, Shearman & Sterling, New York City; member,
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law

MALCOLM MACLEAN, Mayor, Savannah, Ga.

H. A. MacNEILLY, Administrative Assistant to Mayor, Chester, Pa.

JAMES A. MADISON, United States Office of Economic Opportunity

LAWRENCE MALICK, Staff, Community Relations Service, U. S.
Conference of Mayors

JULIUS MANGER, JR., Executive Vice Chairman, National Citizens'
Committee for Community Relations; Chairman
of Board, Manger Hotels, Inc.

ROBERT B. MCKAY, Professor of Law, Associate Dean, New York
University School of Law

PHILIP McMUNIGAL, City Solicitor, Chester, Pa.

GALEN MARTIN, Executive Director, Kentucky Commission on
Human Rights

MELVIN MISTER, Staff, Community Relations Service, U. S.
Conference of Mayors

GLENN R. MURPHY, Research Consultant, International Association,
Chiefs of Police

ROBERT J. O'CONNELL, Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette
University School of Law

JOHN M. PRATT, Counsel, Commission on Religion and Race,
National Council of Churches

SOL RABKIN, Director, Law Department, Anti-Defamation League,
B'nai B'rith
GEORGE SCHERMER, Human Relations Consultant, Former Executive Director, Philadelphia Human Relations Commission; Former Executive Director, Mayor's Interracial Committee, Detroit

SHIRLEY A. SIEGEL, Assistant New York State Attorney General In Charge, Civil Rights Bureau

WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, General Counsel, United States Commission on Civil Rights

RT. REV. MONSIGNOR JOHN D. TOOMEY, Pastor, St. James Church, Savannah, Ga.

GERALD DAVID WHITE, General Counsel, Michigan Civil Rights Commission

JOHN R. WING, Attorney, Shearman & Sterling, New York City

JOSEPH P. WITHERSPOON, Professor of Law, University of Texas

LOUIS M. ZIMMERMAN, Chief, Conciliation Services, City of New York Commission on Human Rights
STATEMENTS OF COMMUNITY CRISIS

in

SAVANNAH, GA.

NEW YORK CITY

CHESTER, PA.

Prepared by JOHN G. FEILD,
Director, Community Relations Service,
United States Conference of Mayors
COMMUNITY CRISIS

Savannah, Georgia had a population of 149,200 in 1960. Located in Chatham County with a total population of 188,000, both the city and county have approximately 34% non-white citizens.

The context within which the demonstrations of 1963 occurred was one of rapid social change in this historic southern coastal city.

Savannah was the first city in Georgia to employ Negro policemen and firemen. Negroes have been actively registering and voting in Savannah for many years. Most public facilities had been desegregated by 1960. The public schools began integration with the 12th grade in 1963-64 under a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals order and is continuing with the 11th grade this year. This is under appeal in the courts by the NAACP.

Although there had been sit-ins in 1960 and 1961 accompanied by a prolonged 15 month boycott of local stores, the situation with respect to restaurants, hotels and motels in Savannah as 1963 began was one of virtually complete segregation. Desegregation of public accommodations became the central target of a series of demonstrations and sit-ins sponsored in June of that year by the local NAACP and another local group known as the Crusade for Voters. Both groups had been involved in earlier protests.
During the first ten days of June over 100 Negroes were arrested for trespassing in sit-ins involving several major downtown restaurants. These arrests, personally ordered by the City Manager and the City Attorney who were on the scene, were followed by a series of demonstrations and protests. The chronology of these events is briefly set down below:

**June 11, 1963:** Several hundred Negroes marched into city hall and crowded into council chambers for a conference with Mayor MacLean. The Crusade for Voters issued a 24 hours ultimatum to the Mayor "to get our freedom for us." At the same time, the Young Adult Council of the NAACP announced continued sit-ins.

That evening over 3,000 Negroes marched into the central business district. Forty-nine adults and many teen-agers were arrested. Peaceful marchers are not arrested. Arrests are for trespass in restaurants and disturbing the peace.

**June 12, 1963:** Three hundred Negroes marched into downtown Savannah.

**June 13, 1963:** The home of a Negro couple, Mr. and Mrs. Arnett Waters was hit by rifle shots. Mrs. Waters is active in Chatham County Council for Human Relations.
June 13, 1963: The Chamber of Commerce offers to negotiate. The issues of the demonstrations are halted. Hosea Williams, head of Crusade for Voters, publicly states that he will not halt demonstrations unless talks with Chamber of Commerce show promise. A scheduled meeting of the Restaurant Association with NAACP failed to come off.

June 14, 1963: The demonstrations were suspended following a Chamber of Commerce statement calling on operators of private businesses to integrate.

June 16, 1963: Press reports rumors that public accommodations will be integrated and demonstrations are suspended for the weekend.

June 17, 1963: When negotiations broke down mass racial demonstrations were resumed. Mayor Malcolm MacLean requested state aid. Governor Sandors dispatched 52 state patrolmen. Mayor MacLean indicates he may request martial law. No one was arrested this date, but papers reported that 600 have been arrested to date.

June 18, 1963: In local court actions Crusade for Voters and NAACP enjoined from demonstrating at specific eating places.
June 19 and 20, 1963: Negroes demonstrate again. First violence occurs. Negroes throw bricks and bottles. Leaders of the Crusade for Voters are arrested along with 300 others.

Mayor MacLean publicly asks for end to demonstrations. Hosea Williams, jailed leader of the demonstrations is quoted in the press: "We are going to demonstrate until they accede to our demands or until we die."

June 21, 1963: New negotiations are arranged through civic and religious leaders and once again demonstrations are suspended pending outcome of negotiations with restaurant operators.

June 24, 1963: Bishop Thomas J. McDonough announces that Catholic schools of the Savannah Diocese will be integrated in September.

June 27, 1963: Leaders of Crusade for Voters threaten to renew demonstrations which have been curtailed since June 23rd.

June 28, 1963: "Savannahians for Peaceful Progress", a new civic group placed a one-eighth page advertisement in Savannah NEWS calling upon citizens to support store owners, businessmen if "they lead the way".

June 30 and July 1, 1963: Board of Education approves a one-grade-a-year plan for school integration starting with 12th grade.
July 5, 1963: Four hundred Negroes marched on the Chatham County jail to support Benjamin Clark, Crusade for Voters leader, who had been sentenced to 20 months or $1500 fine.

July 6, 1963: A boycott of white merchants was announced following a mass meeting of 1000 persons. On the same day thirty whites appeared picketing to protest integration.

July 11, 1963: Racial violence erupted again when police and Negroes fought at several downtown intersections during a parade demonstration. Two Negroes are wounded by gunfire. Seventy-one persons were arrested. Some Negro leaders join the City Manager in attempts to curb violence. Hosea Williams, leader of Crusade for Voters, is in jail under a peace warrant. His assistant, Benjamin Clark, leads new demonstrations demanding Williams' release.

July 12, 1963: White segregationists undertake a march to "find out if white people have the same rights as Negroes."

July 13, 1963: Press reports "Savannah calm" after the disorder of July 11. Leon Cox, Georgia State Field Secretary for the NAACP criticizes the Savannah demonstrations as pointless.

July 15, 1963: Hosea Williams issued a plea from his jail cell to remain "non-violent" and to cease massive street marches.
Savannah Negroes hold mass meeting. Threaten to resume marches if peace talks fail.

July 16, 1963: Negroes march but are stopped by City Manager and police. They retire peacefully.

A group of 100 white businessmen form a working committee to settle local racial problems and announced they would negotiate with "responsible Negro leadership."

July 21, 1963: An estimated 2,000 whites attended a KKK staged rally.

August 2 and 3, 1963: White and Negro leaders announce that "an accord is near."

August 8, 1963: Press reports that over 50 Negroes have been convicted of trespass and fined $100 each for each offense. Over 100 remain in jail.

August 22, 1963: Hosea Williams announces that demonstrations are over.

Business leaders announced a plan to desegregate hotels, motels and theatres by October 1st. Restaurant operators did not agree, but restaurants in hotels and motels will be open.
October 3, 1963: Integration of hotels and other public accommodations begin without incident.

October 29, 1963: The KKK picketed the Savannah Theatre and a tear gas bomb was exploded inside as theatre integration begins.

December 4, 1963: Eighteen Negroes seek court test of constitutionality of Georgia trespass law.

April 1, 1964: Savannah Chamber of Commerce membership votes to admit Negroes to membership by substantial margin.


12/3/64
COMMUNITY CRISIS - NEW YORK CITY

In the summer of 1963, the Bronx Chapter of the Congress on Racial Equality picketed a number of hamburger restaurants owned by the White Castle chain as part of the movement to increase opportunities for minority group employment. The employment policies of the White Castle chain were, in the judgment of the Congress of Racial Equality, in fact discriminatory against minority group persons. The picketing was the occasion for an unexpectedly vigorous anti-Negro reaction on the part of hundreds of white youths who assembled at one of the Castles for the purpose of heckling the pickets. A large police force was needed to keep the peace during the first week of the demonstration. Shortly after, the City Commission on Human Rights was called upon to mediate and conciliate the dispute between the two private organizations, CORE on the one hand and White Castle on the other. This was accomplished by Madison S. Jones, Executive Director of the Commission, Irving Goldaber, Deputy Director, Louis M. Zimmerman, Chief of Conciliation, Harold Goldblatt, Chief of Research and Warren A. Smith, Human Rights Specialist.

The picketing grew out of the failure of negotiations between CORE and representatives of the White Castle restaurant chain. On June 23, CORE had requested the employment of four Negro car hops and four Negroes for inside work, for the month of July.
2- New York City

Subsequently a request to hire five more for the same period was made and this was agreed to by management. Later this figure was raised to 25 to be hired during July in the Bronx, and 25 a month for the New York-New Jersey area, for the next nine months. White Castle turned this down and subsequently picketing started.

Early Saturday morning July 6, picketing began in the Bronx at the White Castle restaurant on Allerton Avenue and Boston Post Road. Several thousand jeering white persons, primarily teenagers, pelted CORE pickets with rocks, eggs, and tomatoes from 10:30 P.M. until midnight. A riot call brought 60 policemen to the scene. One youth was arrested, and CORE criticized the police for letting white youth get out of hand.

On July 7, picketing resumed at 9:00 A.M. and lasted around the clock. The diner closed and reopened at 2:20 A.M. and eight pickets began a sit-in. At nightfall a crowd began to gather and by midnight a thousand people milled around outside the restaurant. About seventy-five policemen were assigned to the restaurant, including 50 from the Tactical Patrol Force, specially trained for handling civil disturbances. Barricades were set up to keep young spectators dispersed and about a block away from the pickets. Rain began to fall at 1:15 A.M. and many white youths went home.
On Monday, July 8, the Human Rights Commission sent a staff person to the Bronx to gather first hand information, about the situation. Also a telegram was sent to the Chairman of the Bronx CORE in an attempt to arrange a meeting to discuss the matter with him.

Picketing continued until 1:00 A.M. An estimated 1,000 youths roamed the area around the restaurant hurling stones and vegetables at passing cars occupied by Negroes. At approximately 11:00 P.M. the police began to clear the area. People inside the restaurant were ordered to leave and no one was permitted to enter. Due to the efforts of 300 policemen, the police and the pickets were the only people in the streets surrounding the restaurant at midnight.

On July 9 at 9:00 A.M., 60 pickets were marching in front of the restaurant, and picketing continued until 12:30 A.M. A brief free-for-all began at 10:40 P.M. interrupting more than three hours of uneasy order that had been enforced on a crowd of several hundred hecklers by police. Thirty policemen subdued two youths who then fled, and two men were arrested on charges of simple assault. As a result of this incident police blocked off the streets around the restaurant.
Meanwhile, after talking with a CORE representative, the Human Rights Commission wired the president of White Castle requesting his attendance at a meeting at the Commission's office to discuss the situation.

On July 10 the number of pickets reached 75, but Wednesday was the first nonviolent night since the CORE demonstrations began. Young white girls carrying signs reading "Vote Right Wing Conservative" and a man representing the National Association for the Advancement of White People arrived on the scene at about 10:30 P.M. The CORE leader in the Bronx threatened to picket all four White Castle diners in the borough unless his demands were met. The lack of violence was due to large police presence. Many were drawn from the Tactical Patrol Force. However, there were scores of detectives, mounted men, motorcycle patrolmen as well. About 300 policemen were assigned to cover the area around the restaurant.

On July 11, the assistant general counsel for White Castle, Inc. in Columbus, Ohio and the assistant district manager for the New York-New Jersey Division met with representatives of the Commission. Company representatives stated that their previous meetings with CORE were very stormy and that they had no interest at all in sitting across the table from CORE to negotiate the matter.
They were willing, however, for Commission representatives to be mediators and keep the matter under surveillance after an agreement was reached.

On the matter of an agreement, the company stated that they saw no reason to have an agreement with any private organization and that they were purely a private enterprise system; that they were observing the Fair Employment Practices Law of the State of New York and no private group had the right to tell them what to do.

On July 12 the same Commission representatives met with Bronx CORE representatives. Also present was an advisor from National CORE. At this meeting CORE presented their demands, which included:

1. Twenty-five Negro and Spanish speaking people to be hired within 30 days after agreement was reached (excluding the hiring of porters). Such hiring to be based on regular turnover, normal summer expansion, business condition and regular company hiring standards.

2. Twenty-five Negro and Spanish speaking people to be hired per month in the division over a period of 9 months, with the same hiring conditions as set forth in pp. 1.

3. Special effort to be made to recruit these people by using CORE through the Commission, want ads in newspapers including the minority-group press, and a statement that White Castle is an equal opportunity employer.

4. The Commission to review the employment policies and practices of White Castle as part of the implementation of any agreement.

5. Positive steps to be taken by White Castle to upgrade qualified Negro and Spanish speaking personnel.
6. Pickets to cease their activities when an agreement was reached and that picketing would not resume until clearance was obtained from the Commission.

On the afternoon of July 12, the Commission representatives met with White Castle to review the CORE demands. CORE representatives were in the office to be ready to negotiate. With regard to point 1, White Castle representatives offered to try to achieve a goal of between 15 and 25 Negro and Spanish speaking people; and with regard to point 2, between 7 and 10 to be reached as a goal. Further points were tentatively agreed to with the understanding that any offer or acceptance of terms would have to be cleared with home office officials in Columbus, Ohio.

(It is to be noted that White Castle gave tentative agreement to the Commission's proposal to meet with CORE representatives across the table at future meetings).

The CORE group was then met with separately, and the offer of 15 to 25 and 7 to 10 was flatly rejected. This rejection was placed before White Castle and negotiations were suspended pending White Castle's consultation with their officials over the weekend.

On July 15, White Castle representatives presented their reply to CORE's demands which had been cleared with their central office.
In essence, all points of controversy had been complied with, with the exception of naming any figures as goals in points 1 and 2. Throughout the negotiations the company had taken a firm position that they would never agree to specific figures as goals, quotas, etc., since they felt this was illegal and could be the subject of court censure. Therefore, the company indicated they would try to employ a reasonable number of Negro and Spanish speaking persons in accordance with points 1 and 2. The entire matter was communicated to CORE at a special meeting that day, who further stated they wanted to discuss it with White Castle.

On July 16, a meeting was held with all parties concerned present at the conference table. At this time White Castle verbally agreed to a goal of hiring 25 Negro and Spanish speaking people in the Bronx over a 30 day period, and in the division over a 90 day period, in accordance with points 1 and 2. They would not specify this in any written agreement or letter. However, White Castle agreed to consult further with legal counsel on the matter and tentatively agreed to have their New York counsel confer with CORE's counsel to define the legality of such a procedure. Other points in the projected agreement were only changed in wording. CORE indicated they were ready to take the entire matter to their membership and policy making group for consideration.
On the evening of July 16, the Executive Director received a call from the assistant district manager of White Castle indicating that he was withdrawing his commitment of 25 Negro and Spanish speaking people as a goal in point 1, and substituting the figure of 13. On point 2, they would agree to 25 for the division over a 90 day period. The proposal was then communicated to CORE, whose representatives indicated this was not acceptable.

On July 17, representatives of White Castle again met with Commission staff to discuss the breakdown in negotiations. At this time White Castle was joined by local counsel retained by the company. After much discussion they agreed to confer again with representatives of CORE. At this meeting, the White Castle representatives stated that the figures in the goal requested by CORE were unrealistic. There was further discussion of the figure of 25 minority group personnel in the Bronx over a 30 day period, and 25 per month for nine months in the New York-New Jersey division. White Castle kept insisting that these figures were most unrealistic, particularly those for the division. However, they indicated they would transmit this information for consideration to their home office.

On July 18, word was received from White Castle that they would not deal with CORE. They felt they were being blackjacked into
an agreement with an organization that had nothing to do with their business and that any consideration of goals, quotas, etc., was beyond question. This information was transmitted to CORE.

On **July 25**, the Executive Director talked to the assistant district manager and arranged to have a representative of the Commission examine the books of White Castle to ascertain the rate of turnover, job opportunities and all other information which would be germane to continuing to work with White Castle so that their employment policies would reflect the effectiveness of their July 16th proposal to the Commission.

From **July 18** to **August 8**, negotiations were deadlocked and CORE picketing continued throughout this period. Violence subsided as a result of the continuing presence of large numbers of police, as picketing spread to other White Castle restaurants.

On **July 20**, James Farmer, National Director of CORE, announced the immediate initiation of picketing in all 28 hamburger restaurants in the New York metropolitan area. He also mentioned the possibility of eventually starting a nationwide boycott of White Castle restaurants.

On **July 24**, picketing began at a White Castle restaurant in North Bergen, New Jersey, and several pickets were arrested for
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blocking the entrance to the restaurant. CORE believed that the
White Castle chain had "reneged" on its agreement to settle the
dispute.

On August 2, announcement was made of the scheduling of a
mass demonstration for August 8 at the Bronx restaurant which had
been the scene of so much community tension.

On August 9, five weeks of picketing of White Castle restaurants
ended with an agreement between White Castle management and the
CORE on hiring more Negroes and Puerto Ricans by the chain. Pickets
were withdrawn in the afternoon. White Castle agreed to revise
recruitment techniques in their continuing effort to maintain a
more realistic ethnic balance in all levels of employment. Within
10 days the management would hire six Negroes and Puerto Ricans
in the Bronx bringing the total to 10. The CORE leadership was
assured that those workers would have an opportunity for advancement.
After 10 days, a 30-day "crash program" would get underway consisting
of: placing employment ads in Negro and Puerto Rican papers stating
that White Castle is an "equal opportunity employer." The manage-
ment cooperated with the New York State Employment Service in the
placing of minority groups. Preferential treatment will be given
Negroes and Puerto Ricans who apply for jobs. Representatives of
the City Commission on Human Rights will be stationed at all White
Castle hiring places to make sure the agreement is carried out.

12/3/64
COMMUNITY CRISIS - CHESTER

Chester, Pennsylvania, a port city annexed to Philadelphia on the Delaware River, has a population of 64,000. One of the most significant social changes between 1950 and 1960 was the rapid growth, more than 12%, in the city's non-white population. At the time of the demonstrations of 1963 and 1964 approximately 33% of Chester's population was Negro.

Although Chester's Negro citizens have always had open access to hotels, restaurants, and other public accommodations, unemployment and poverty have characterized their living conditions. In 1963 at least 14% of the employable Negroes were jobless, compared to seven percent of the employable whites. Nearly one-half of the 27,000 Negroes subsist on an annual family income of less than $4000 - 13% of the Negro families live in abject squalor with incomes of less than $1000. Most of the Negroes live near the great industrial plants in cramped neighborhoods.

Educational opportunities have also been limited for Chester Negroes. In 1963 Negro children accounted for nearly half of the city's school age population. Chester's 17 schools have always been operated on an integrated basis, but at the time of the demonstrations three schools had all Negro pupils and four others had more than 80%. Many of the schools, particularly those in
Negro neighborhoods, were old and had poor facilities. Although, by 1963, $100,000 had been spent on improving the old buildings and three new schools had been constructed, seven school buildings had been condemned and abandoned.

In July 1963 Mayor Eyre, responding to the growing tensions and pressures, created a 16 member Chester Commission on Human Relations to air Negro grievances and improve equal opportunity.

On July 25, 26, and 27, Negroes, under NAACP leadership, conducted a sit-in at the Chester Municipal Building to protest the composition of the Chester Human Relations Commission. The demonstrators demanded an equal number of whites and Negroes on the Commission. No arrests were made, and the demonstrators dispersed to give Mayor Eyre time to reach a decision on their demands.

In September, 1963, Stanley Branch, in protest to sluggish NAACP leadership, organized a new, more militant civil rights movement, the Chester Committee For Freedom Now (CFFN). Immediately the CFFN began to act. In October the CFFN demanded changes in conditions at the Franklin Elementary School. Failing to receive a favorable response to these demands from city officials and the school board, the CFFN organized a series of mass demonstrations
at the Franklin School and in downtown Chester protesting the
defacto school segregation, the poor facilities, and overcrowding.

On November 12, students from nearby colleges and (Negro and
white clergymen) joined the picket lines and blocked the entrance
to the Franklin School. At that time, the school board ordered the—
school closed. The following day, November 13, at a demonstration
at the Chester Municipal Building 158 demonstrators were arrested.
On November 14, 80 more school pickets were arrested for blocking
school entries. State police were called in to assist local en-
forcement officers. Finally, on November 17, the demonstrations
ended after a promise to stop picketing was exchanged for Mayor
and school board agreements to transfer pupils to less crowded
schools and to drop all charges against arrested demonstrators.

From December 1963 to February 1964 there were no more
similar demonstrations. Invective was increased between branch
and city officials, including the school board, and the school
board refused to meet with CFFN leaders.*

In January, 1964, Mayor James H. Gorbey replaced Mayor Eyre
and announced a firm policy of law and order and a refusal to tol-
erate irresponsible demonstrations. It was in this context that
new rallies and demonstrations were called by CFFN leadership in
February to demand stepped-up desegregation and school improvement efforts, and to provide an impetus to negotiation.

On Monday, February 10th, after an evening meeting of the Committee For Freedom Now to finalize plans for a school boycott, some 300 demonstrators marched downtown to the police station (evidently to protest police arrests during demonstrations earlier that day). A brief scuffle broke out in front of the station as police tried to take one of the demonstrators, who had been arrested earlier in the day in a lie-in, into the station. On the way to the station, the demonstrators had been run through by a car whose driver was not apprehended. At least two suffered leg injuries.

On February 13th the school boycott was held, with picket-demonstrations at the boycotted schools. Wilbur Johnson, a member of CFFN executive board, was arrested and held on four counts of traffic violation, but no other trouble occurred during the demonstrations. At about 5 P.M., however, CFFN leaders Stanley Branche and Dr. Felder Rouse were arrested and taken from CFFN headquarters, on charges of criminal libel and conspiracy to commit an unlawful act, brought against them by the Rev. Donald Ming.

Ming, acting Chairman of the Chester Human Relations Commission, had been called an Uncle Tom by Branche and Rouse, and hanged in
effigy the night before. A volatile situation developed over these arrests, but quieted when Branches and Rouse were released that evening on $500 bail.

On Easter weekend, March 27-30, three days of demonstrations were held. On Good Friday, no incidents were reported. On Saturday, in the midst of the last-minute shopping rush, a "sit-down" was held in the busiest intersection of downtown Chester at noon. Police waded in to arrest, swinging riot sticks. Several demonstrators were hurt, as well as a photographer from a Delaware newspaper, who was knocked down by the police and taken to the station, held for a time, and then released.

While police were breaking up this demonstration, two others were started in the downtown area. The 77 arrested that day came from all three. At least 10 persons were injured (one officer), and one demonstrator was hospitalized. The 43 adults were fined $350 each, plus costs, and were further held at Broadmeadows Prison Farm on bail of $500 to $1000, charged with unlawful assembly and affray. The 34 juveniles were turned over to County authorities.

On Easter Sunday, March 30th, a quiet protest march was held, with about 50 demonstrators, for the first time protesting the
brutality of Chester police.

In April, the Pennsylvania HRC tried to work out a solution to the dispute, but was not successful.

On the evening of April 24th, after school officials had made application to the Delaware County Court for an injunction against further civil rights demonstrations, a rally was attended by some 500 persons to plan an orderly protest. Also at issue was the alleged brutality of police treatment of the 216 persons arrested in a demonstration two nights before, and still being held. After the meeting, some 50 people blocked traffic at a nearby intersection. Police arrived in gradual force, warning them to leave or be arrested. Scuffling broke out as they began to make arrests and load demonstrators on buses. About 100 state police arrived, swinging riot sticks and clearing the area. Twenty-eight demonstrators were arrested, six policemen injured, and reportedly some demonstrators injured.

Meanwhile, the FBI had been called in to investigate alleged brutality of Chester police in the arrest of two reporters of the Philadelphia Bulletin, who were covering the April 22nd demonstration, and the beating of one of them.

The following day, Saturday, April 25th, Governor Scranton met secretly with Mayor James Gorbey and the attorney for the
Chester school board, ordered the Pennsylvania HRC to meet Monday to set hearings on the issue of alleged discrimination in Chester public schools.

On Monday, April 27th, the County Court issued an injunction against further school demonstrations. Branche nevertheless announced scheduling of a mass protest march for Saturday, May 2nd, although the NAACP announced a 7-day moratorium on demonstrations. At the last moment, Branche called it off, saying that "rowdies" from Philadelphia and New York had come in "hell-bent for trouble."
Program on
The Community and Racial Crises

LAWS GOVERNING DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER
FORMS OF PROTEST

By: ROBERT B. MCKAY

Professor of Law, Associate Dean, New York
University School of Law

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   2. Reversal of "color-blind" Constitution argument.
   3. Acceleration of time table for school desegregation in the South.
   4. Devising of new plans for school integration in the North.

D. Involvement of the "sense of injustice."

V. First steps toward solution.

A. Peaceful protest is protected by the first amendment.
   1. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4.

B. Sit-ins.
2. Trespass statutes:
   
   1. *Peterson v. Greenville*, 373 U.S. 244;  
   

3. School boycotts.  


C. Probing the limits.
Program on

"The Community and Racial Crises"

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

HAROLD H. GREENE
Chief, Appeals and Research Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice

I. Historical Background

A) Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments

B) Criminal Enforcement Statutes

C) Experience in Enforcement
   1. General factors
   2. Jury trial problem

D) Changing Attitudes
   1. Supreme Court decisions in 1930's
   2. Executive action

E) Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960
   1. Provisions
   2. Enforcement

II. Title I - Voting Rights

A) Relationship to 1957 and 1960 Acts

B) Need and Purpose

C) Provisions

III. Title II - Public Accomodations

A) Demonstrations

B) Provisions of Title
1. Suit by individuals

2. Suit by Attorney General

3. Relationship to State laws

C) Constitutional Basis

D) Enforcement Procedure

IV. Titles III and IV - Desegregation of Public Facilities and Schools

A) Court Decisions on Public Facilities

B) Brown v. Board of Education and its Implementation

C) Purpose of Titles III and IV

D) Limitations on Federal Action

V. Title VII - Employment

A) Provisions

B) Limitations of Coverage and Enforcement

VI. Other Provisions

A) Civil Rights Commission

B) Use of Federal Funds

C) Intervention and Removal

D) Community Relations Service

E) Other

VII. Policies of Enforcement and Outlook

A) Cooperation with Community Relations Service, State and Local Agencies

B) Federal Action

C) Outlook for Compliance

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FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

WILLIAM L. TAYLOR
General Counsel, United States Commission on Civil Rights

I. Federal grants-in-aid to states, and localities; their growing importance in meeting public needs.

II. Evolution of Federal Policy -

A. Federal policy of "neutrality" with respect to racial discrimination by recipients of Federal funds.

B. Effects of the "neutrality" policy upon opportunity for Negroes in housing, education, employment.

C. Gradual reversal of "neutrality" policy -

1. Judicial decisions on the obligations of the Federal government re: racial discrimination in programs it assists. The evolving concept of "state action."

2. Executive Orders prohibiting discrimination in federal or federally assisted activities: (a) employment - Federal employment, Federal contract employment, Federally assisted construction employment, Federally assisted and regulated state employment, Federal programs of recruitment and training; (b) housing - public housing, urban renewal, FHA and VA, (c) education impacted area and assistance to higher education (NDEA institutes).

3. Legislation - Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
III. Compliance with the new Federal policy -

A. Programs affected by new policy (e.g. education, housing, health).

B. Types of discrimination prohibited.

C. Procedures for achieving compliance.

Time permitting, the following additional subjects will be touched upon:

1. Judicial decisions concerning "de facto" segregation of public schools in the North.

2. The criminal civil rights laws as they affect police misconduct, and recommendations of the Commission on Civil Rights for amending the laws and providing affirmative Federal assistance to improve the administration of justice.
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LOCAL LAWS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION -- SALIENT LEGAL ISSUES

DAVID W. CRAIG
City Solicitor, City of Pittsburgh

A. ENABLING LAWS --- STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR NON-HOME-RULE CITIES

1. Desirability of express authorization --- The statewide (or region-wide) nature of the public interest in equal rights is used as an argument against local power.

2. Where no enabling laws specifically allow equal rights ordinances -- Will general statutory powers to regulate for health-safety-welfare support them?

3. Pre-emption by state -- Where state laws directly implement equal rights, is local legislative action excluded?

B. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT -- "Speak softly and -- "

1. Organization -- A widely-representative voice-of-the-community commission is always helpful.

2. Positive Processes -- Consider emphasis upon education of business groups (e.g. multilists, etc.) to utilize group conscience.

3. Test Cases -- See that the strong fact situations are used for judicial tests of constitutionality.

4. Injunctive Remedy -- In housing purchase cases, where contract is incomplete, seek injunction to require "bargaining in good faith."
C. PUBLIC ACCOMODATIONS

1. **Coverage** -- What accomodations are public? The club device.

2. **Police Power Purpose** -- Silver lining: Actual instances of unrest provide part of reasons why right to equal treatment overbalances "private business" choice.

D. EQUAL emploiMENT OPPORTUNITY

1. **Scope** -- In addition to prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion and national origin, shall discrimination on account of age and/or sex be prohibited? Don't forget to cover training programs and apprenticeships.

2. **Test of Discrimination** -- Where subjective considerations for selection are involved (personality, etc.) among applicants with equal objective qualifications, is there a "presumption" favoring the minority applicant?

3. **Rational Relevancy** -- What approaches can be used where religion and national origin are claimed to be relevant to selection? Must religious organizations receive exemption?
4. **Recruiting Sources Dodge** -- If circumvention through the use of limited recruiting sources is prohibited, will all specialized placement services be outlawed?

5. **Labor Organizations** -- Where union membership is a practical necessity, what weight should be allowed union constitution provisions, such as those which provide a membership vote as a condition of membership?

6. **Public Contract** -- Is forfeiture of the contract a feasible penalty when a public contractor discriminates illegally?

E. **OPEN OCCUPANCY** -- Fair Housing

1. **Coverage** -- As respects the inclusion or exclusion of one-family dwellings, for example, should there be reliance upon the "public accommodations" analogy? Don't forget financing institutions.

2. **Real Estate Industry** -- Upon a business licensing theory, can realtors be regulated more extensively than transactions not conducted as a business?
3. "Personal Residence" -- Is it valid to exempt situations (e.g., two-family dwellings) in which the landlord continues to reside on the premises? Under that theory, why exempt the sale of one-family dwellings?

4. Test of Discrimination -- The "economic confession" is found in the claim that discrimination is practiced only because of the threat of loss of clientele (tenants, etc.).

5. Blockbusting -- How can it be defined?

6. "Benign" Quotas -- Can a benign quota be validly authorized in any situations, such as pilot integration projects?
The Community and Racial Crises

LOCAL AND STATE RESOURCES

IN RESOLVING RACIAL PROBLEMS

By: GEORGE SCHERMER

While the topic suggests public (i.e. governmental) resources the total resources available to the community must be considered.

The most important resources are those that will be referred to in this discussion as the basic institutions of the community. These basic institutions include the local government itself, the police, health and welfare agencies, the courts, schools, media of communications, business and industry, chamber of commerce, labor organizations, churches, etc.

If these basic institutions are properly supported, responsibly led, capably managed and are committed to serving the needs of the total community including persons of all racial and ethnic groups, the community is well on its way to resolving its racial problems.

The problem is that, in so many communities, these basic institutions are not well supported, are not alert to the racial problems, are incompetently managed and are often under biased leadership or management. Much of the task of resolving racial problems is one of improving and constructively reforming these basic institutions.

States; municipalities; and national; statewide and local civic; religious and ethnic groups have created specialized agencies and services for resolving or assisting in the resolution of racial problems.

Typical of such agencies and services are:

State Commissions on Human Rights. (Other titles include Human Relations, Fair Practices Commissions, etc.)

Municipal Commissions on Human Relations. (Other titles include Human Rights, Community Relations, Intergroup Relations, Mayors Interracial Committees, etc.)

National Civil Rights Organizations with local branches or constituencies. NAACP, CORE, SNCC, SCLC. (Often there are independent local groups that have an informal and "spiritual" identification with one or another of these). These tend to be the organized "voice" of large segments of the minority
group although their formal "dues paying" constituency may be relatively small.

National Ethnic and/or Religious Organizations expressing a civil rights concern, with local branches or constituencies:

National Council of Churches - Dept. of Racial and Cultural Relations

National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice

American Jewish Congress.

National Agencies - some with and some without local branches, with nationally directed professional staffs capable of providing highly competent technical assistance. American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, American Friends Service Committee, American Civil Liberties Union, Potomac Institute, Southern Regional Council

National Service Agencies with local service branches

National Urban League

Independent State or Local Councils on Human Relations or the equivalent.

The specialized governmental agencies fall into four general categories:

*State Commissions empowered to administer and enforce statutes prohibiting discrimination in one or several areas such as employment, housing, public accommodations, education. Such agencies are usually authorized to promote and conduct research, educational and informational programs, and to positively "condition" public attitudes.

*State Advisory Commissions without administrative powers.

*Municipal Commissions empowered by charter or ordinance to administer anti-discrimination laws and to conduct educational and community relations programs.

*Municipal Commissions or Mayors Committees empowered to conduct educational programs and/or to serve as an advisory group.

There is a tendency among the staffs of the public and private specialized agencies to display some degree of competitiveness. Also, some people decry the multiplicity of agencies and organizations as "confusing and wasteful".
An astute public administrator or executive of a human relations agency will see strength rather than weakness in the abundance of concerned groups.

One very important requirement for wholesome community relations is the involvement and participation of the largest possible number of citizens and citizen organizations in both the discussion of the issues and problems and in the implementation of programs.

Genuine and meaningful citizen involvement on a mass basis through a single organization or several of them is almost impossible. Most people will work with which they are already identified or can identify in a personal way. They want to feel that the organization is unique and imparts to them an individuality and uniqueness that distinguishes them from the mass. At the same time they want to feel that the organization is effective (i.e. has power) and lends to them a sense of power and effectiveress.

It is inevitable and essential, therefore, that there be a great many organizations, each of which has qualities which are unique. It is also inevitable that only those that can demonstrate effectiveness will survive.

Diversity and a degree of conflict among the organizations need not be disquieting. It is the task of the public administrator, human relations executive or civic leader to supply a forum within which communication and dialogue can take place and resolution of misunderstanding can occur.

Effective programming for promoting equal opportunity, reducing tensions and developing positive community relations requires an extremely broad range of services and skills. The legal defense capabilities of the NAACP, ACLU and kindred groups; the research and communications skills of groups such as AJC, ADL and NCCJ; the community organization know-how of AFSC; the specialized knowledge of the NCADH are all of tremendous value, and local administrators should want to tap those resources whenever possible.

All of these agencies and organizations have limited resources. It is not wise to "turn a problem over" to any of them. The problem is local and the responsibility for resolving it rests with local government. The Mayor, the city commission or city manager cannot escape the responsibility which is his or theirs. The agencies are resources, not "bag-holders".

Where the regulation of practices and the control of conflict is required, and a great deal is required, the responsibility rests solely upon government. While some large cities have established regulatory bodies, it has become quite evident that regulation is best performed by state and federal agencies.
The control of conflict is normally seen as a local police function. While that view is traditional and has a profound legal base, it ought to be thoroughly reexamined. The local police should have the responsibility of preventing conflict and ought to be thoroughly trained to do it. However, there are few local police forces either adequately manned or trained to control major outbreaks of violence. Perhaps there should be specially trained, highly mobile units of state police at the ready for such disturbances with local governmental and police officials conditioned to call for assistance in good time, rather than feeling that a call for help is an admission of failure.

In summary: The problems of race relations have such serious dimensions today that all levels of government, federal, state and local must accept responsibility and prepare themselves for taking all necessary and appropriate preventive and curative measures. If appropriate measures are taken to resolve the problems of discrimination, limited opportunity, slum living conditions, inadequate education, and the absence of communication and understanding, then the control of conflict is less a problem. However, conflict is inherent in the present condition and its control must be given due consideration.